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Posthumous Conception in South Australia: The Case Continues in Re 
H, AE (No 3) [2013] SASC 196 
 
Introduction  
 
Posthumous conception involves a person utilising assisted reproductive technology (ART) in an 
attempt to have a child with the gametes of a partner who has died. The use of ART in this context 
inevitably raises difficult ethical issues.
1
 For example, some have questioned whether it is acceptable 
to create a child in circumstances where he or she will be born into a single-parent family, in the 
knowledge that the child will never have the opportunity to meet or form a relationship with the 
biological parent who died.  
 
The recent decision of Re H, AE (No 3) [2013] SASC 196 addresses the issue of posthumous 
conception and raises some questions about the permissibility of such practices in Australia under 
the framework of national ethical guidelines. Prior to setting out the relevant background of the case, 
it is useful to note the difficult legal issues that arise in the context of posthumous conception. Thus, 
the question arises as to whether it is lawful to harvest sperm from a deceased person where prior 
consent for sperm retrieval has not been obtained. There are also issues associated with property 
rights and ownership, in terms of who has the right of possession over the sperm once it is removed. 
Moreover, once the sperm has been harvested, the issue of whether it is lawful to use the sperm in an 
ART procedure, in an attempt to conceive a child, also raises problems. These issues were relevant to 
the case in question.  
 
The relevant background: issues facing the applicant  
 
The decision in Re H, AE (No 3) [2013] SASC 196 is the third case concerning the applicant; a South 
Australian woman who wished to retrieve sperm from her deceased partner following his unexpected 
death, so that the possibility of having a child by him remained an option. The woman’s partner died 
in a motor vehicle accident in March 2011. Immediately after the accident, the woman made an 
application for an order that would grant permission to medical practitioners to remove and preserve 
the deceased’s sperm (Re H, AE [2012] SASC 146). Gray J granted permission for the sperm to be 
retrieved, relying on the Court’s inherent jurisdiction as the justification for the order.2 The order 
also stipulated that the sperm could not be used for any purpose without a further order from the 
court. 
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 It is worth noting that there have been a series of cases where the courts have arrived at different conclusions 
concerning the issue of whether the inherent jurisdiction extends to granting permission to retrieve sperm from a 
deceased person, for the purpose of storing the sperm for use in an ART procedure. For example, in Re Gray [2001] 2 Qd 
R 35, Chesterman J considered the scope of the parens patriae jurisdiction and formed the view that the jurisdiction does 
not extend to such a purpose, based on the fact that it could not be invoked ‘in the case of a body from which has 
departed’ (at [11]). Furthermore, his Honour concluded that the deceased’s personal representative, or parents or spouse, 
have ‘a right to possession of the body only for the purposes of ensuring prompt and decent disposal’ (at [18]). A similar 
approach was adopted in Baker v State of Queensland [2003] QSC 2 (6 January 2003). However, Atkinson J took a 
different view in the decision of In the Matter of Denman [2004] 2 Qd R 595, deciding that in cases where removal of 
sperm in such circumstances is not prohibited by statute, the removal of sperm ought to be permitted unless this is likely 
to result in harm to others. 
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Once the sperm had been harvested from the deceased and placed into storage, it was necessary to 
obtain the approval of the court to determine the future use of the sperm.  In Re H, AE (No 2) [2012] 
SASC 177, the woman made a second application seeking a declaration that she was entitled to 
possession of the extracted sperm. The woman’s application did not stipulate the way in which the 
sperm would be used, but as it was apparent that she intended to use it for the purpose of attempting 
to become pregnant by way of an ART procedure, the issue of whether she would be permitted to do 
so under the relevant statutory framework was raised by the Attorney-General, who became involved 
in the application as an intervener.  
 
The Attorney-General highlighted the fact that the Assisted Reproductive Treatment Act 1988 (SA) 
imposes a regulatory framework relevant to the delivery of ART services in South Australia, which 
would impact on the applicant. The statutory framework imposes a number of conditions of 
registration on ART providers, including restrictions on the accessibility of the technology. Most 
notably, the legislation requires that the welfare of any child to be born following the provision of 
ART services must be regarded as the paramount consideration,
3
 which has significant impact in 
cases concerning posthumous conception. Also of particular relevance to the woman’s circumstances 
was the fact that the statutory provisions permit access to ART services only where the woman is, or 
appears to be, infertile, or where there is a risk that a serious genetic condition will be transmitted to 
a child by way of natural conception.
4
 Furthermore, the legislation stipulates that in cases where the 
sperm donor has died, the sperm should have been harvested prior to his death or an embryo should 
have been created as a consequence of undergoing ART services.
5
 These conditions could not be 
satisfied in the woman’s circumstances. Additionally, the legislation requires that consent to the use 
of gametes in an ART procedure must have been obtained prior to the death of the sperm donor. For 
these reasons, the Attorney-General contended that the court should consider the relevance of the 
legislative restrictions when determining whether to exercise discretion in granting declaratory relief. 
 
Gray J outlined evidence provided to the Court that supported the view that the applicant and her 
partner had intended to start a family. This led him to conclude that their attempts to start a family 
would have continued if the deceased had not died.
6
 However, given that the woman was seeking 
possession of the sperm as if it were a species of property that could be the subject of ownership, his 
Honour also considered whether the sperm could be considered a form of property. He concluded 
that the sperm could be classed as property.
7
 However, it was held that as it was the court and not the 
deceased that provided consent to the extraction and storage of the sperm, and that the use of the 
sperm for the creation of life brings into play considerations concerning the welfare of any 
prospective children created as a result, the court should retain control over the use of the sperm.
8
 
His Honour acknowledged that the applicant had made out a prima facie case for possession of the 
sperm, but only for a purpose that is approved by the court.
9
 
 
Gray J concluded that the order granting possession to the applicant was subject to resolution of the 
issue raised by the Attorney-General. As outlined above, this centred on the fact that it was not 
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possible for an ART practitioner in South Australia to lawfully provide ART services to the woman 
under the South Australian legislation. However, it was also noted that it was open to the Minister 
for Health and Ageing (responsible for administering the legislation), to vary the conditions of 
registration imposed upon an ART provider.
10
 Therefore, before making any order concerning 
possession, Gray J stated that the applicant should seek to obtain an exemption from the legislation 
from the Attorney-General. 
 
The decision in Re H, AE (No 3) [2013] SASC 196 
 
Following the decision in Re H, AE (No 2) [2012] SASC 177, the deceased’s parents raised concern 
that they had not been consulted in regard to the application. The applicant had submitted two sworn 
affidavits in her evidence stating that the deceased’s parents were supportive of her application. The 
applicant disputed the assertions made by the deceased’s parents, but consequently, the matter was 
relisted.  
 
By the time the matter was heard again by Gray J, the applicant had received a letter from the 
Minister for Health and Ageing which referred to the applicant’s request to have the terms of 
registration under the Assisted Reproductive Treatment Act 1988 (SA) varied, so that she might be 
able to undergo ART services in South Australia. The Minister informed the applicant that he did not 
have the power to vary the conditions of registration as requested. Furthermore, the Minister stated 
that even if he did possess such a power, he would not be willing to vary the conditions, as this 
would run contrary to the policy underpinning the legislation which requires prior consent to the use 
of gametes posthumously. 
 
The applicant subsequently approached an ART clinic in the Australian Capital Territory (ACT) to 
enquire whether she would be able to gain the clinic’s assistance in undergoing in vitro fertilisation 
(IVF) with the gametes. The clinic informed her that she needed to show that the couple had been 
planning a family together prior to the deceased’s death. Given the conclusions previously reached 
by Gray J in the second decision, this could not be disputed. However, the applicant required the 
court’s permission to take possession of the sperm so that it could be used by the clinic in the ACT. 
This further application was not opposed by the deceased’s parents or the Attorney-General. Gray J 
made an order granting possession of the sperm to the applicant for exportation to the ACT clinic, so 
that she could undergo IVF treatment.  
 
Comment 
 
One of the most interesting aspects of the case is the way in which the legislative restrictions in 
South Australia are circumvented, and the interpretation adopted in respect of the national ethical 
guidelines relevant to posthumous conception.  
 
As noted above, the applicant was seeking to export the gametes to the ACT, where no ART 
legislation exists. In such circumstances, ART practices are regulated by national professional and 
ethical guidelines. The National Health and Medical Research Council’s (NHMRC) Ethical 
Guidelines on the Use of Assisted Reproductive Technology in Clinical Practice and Research 
(2007) (“NHMRC Guidelines”) impose a number of requirements relating to posthumous 
conception, one of which is that the deceased should have ‘left clearly expressed and witnessed 
directions consenting to the use of his or her gametes’.11 Gray J noted that the Supreme Court of 
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New South Wales had previously ruled that whilst there is ambiguity in the wording of the NHMRC 
Guidelines in this respect, it is possible that the wording may permit ART clinics to provide services 
in circumstances where there is no written consent.
12
 Notably however, in that particular case it was 
not necessary for the judge to determine the precise meaning of the NHMRC Guidelines and there 
was no conclusive opinion reached in the judgment on this matter.  
 
In another case of similar facts to the applicant’s, the Victorian Civil and Administrative Tribunal 
considered the scope of the NHMRC Guidelines concerning posthumous conception.
13
 Similarly, the 
Tribunal was not required to form a conclusion on the precise meaning of the provisions in the 
Guidelines, as the decision centred on specific legislative provisions contained within the former 
Victorian statutory framework. Nevertheless, the Tribunal formed the view that “directions” relating 
to the posthumous use of gametes need not be in writing and that the matter turned on whether or not 
there had been sufficient clarity expressed by the deceased.
14
 The Tribunal emphasised that the 
NHMRC Guidelines are merely guidelines and that they do not carry the same force as statute, thus 
implying that there may be no consequence for non-compliance. Gray J expressed a similar 
comment: 
 
The guidelines do not, however, have legislative force. As a result, in the Australian Capital 
Territory, there is no legislated consequence for failing to comply with the guidelines; 
compliance is relevant for accreditation purposes only.
15
 
 
Although Gray J acknowledged the ambiguity of the provisions in the NHMRC Guidelines, this 
position neglects the fact that some degree of uncertainty remains in how the Guidelines would apply 
to a case such as the applicant’s. It could be argued that the requirements concerning posthumous 
conception should be read in line with the consent requirements outlined elsewhere in the NHMRC 
Guidelines. Thus, consent must be provided by all participants for the use of gametes or embryos in 
all ART procedures and must be made in writing (NHMRC Guidelines (2007), Cl 9.4.1). The 
question of whether there is evidence to show that an individual intended to start a family with his 
partner when he was alive by way of natural conception is a distinctly different issue to whether the 
deceased provided consent to have his gametes used in an ART procedure following his death. 
Furthermore, a ‘clearly expressed and witnessed directive’ is required to relate to the use of the 
person’s gametes, not whether the person intended to start a family with his partner prior to his 
death. 
 
Finally, it can also be noted that the position adopted in this case “down-plays” the significance of 
the NHMRC Guidelines in terms of their relevance to the Australian regulatory framework. Thus, s 
11 of the Research Involving Human Embryos Act 2002 (Cth) imposes a requirement that ART 
centres must be accredited by the Fertility Society of Australia’s Reproductive Technology 
Accreditation Committee (RTAC). One condition of accreditation is that clinics must comply with 
the NHMRC Guidelines. Therefore, although the Guidelines do not have the force of legislation, 
they are nevertheless enforced indirectly by way of national accreditation requirements and non-
compliance may carry a risk that an ART centre may lose its status as an “accredited” centre. 
Moreover, it should also be noted that the NHMRC Guidelines are considered to be minimal 
standards of acceptable ethical practice. Therefore, disregarding the standards expressed in the 
Guidelines may not be regarded as good practice; a factor that may be considered by an ethics 
committee when asked to review individual cases concerning posthumous conception as they arise 
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on a case-by-case basis (this latter condition is another requirement imposed under the NHMRC 
Guidelines by way of Clause 6.15.1).  
 
Conclusion 
 
The issue of whether a woman should be permitted to use the gametes of her deceased partner 
following his unexpected death is a challenging one. Given the individual circumstances facing the 
applicant in this case, it is understandable that she was met with empathy and understanding by the 
court. However, the reasoning expressed in relation to the NHMRC Guidelines is open to question. 
The impetus to downplay the status of the NHMRC Guidelines was, most likely, driven by the fact 
that the provisions could be interpreted unfavourably in the applicant’s case. The significance of the 
NHMRC Guidelines should not be understated; ethical guidelines provide a statement of what is 
considered to be good practice. Consequently, although there may be no direct consequence for 
failing to adhere to the guidelines, such a failure may still be viewed as falling short of ethical 
standards and good practice. Lastly, it should also be noted that the interpretation of the NHMRC 
Guidelines is an issue of importance for states such as Queensland, where the Guidelines are the only 
source of regulatory control.  
